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Abstract
Do food prices cause political unrest? Throughout history, riots appear to have
frequently broken out as a consequence of high food prices. This paper studies the
impact of food prices on political unrest using monthly data on food prices at the
international level. Because food prices and political unrest are jointly determined,
the incidence of natural disasters in a given month is used in an attempt to identify
the causal relationship between food prices and political unrest. Empirical results
indicate that between January 1990 and January 2011, food price increases have led
to increased political unrest, whereas food price volatility has been associated with
decreases in political unrest. These ndings are consistent with those of the applied
microeconomics literature on the welfare impacts of food prices.
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1 Introduction
Do food prices cause political unrest? Throughout history, riots have frequently broken out
ostensibly as a consequence of high food prices. Since the turn of the millennium, the world
has experienced two major food crises. The rst food crisis took place in 2008. Although
food prices increased by only 3 percent between January 2007 and December 2008, they
increased by 51 percent between January 2007 and March 2008.1 This rise in food prices
was associated with food riots in several countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the
Americas (Schneider, 2008; Bush, 2010).2
The second food crisis, which began at the end of 2010 and saw food prices increase by 40
percent between January 2010 and February 2011, is still ongoing. Once again, this rapid rise
in food prices was associated with political unrest throughout the world, but it was perhaps
most prominently associated with the so-called Arab Spring of 2011a series of events which
began with food riots in Algeria and in Tunisia in early January 2011 (Ciezadlo, 2011), which
led to the collapse of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia and of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, and
which is still unfolding in Syria and Yemen. Although it is not possible to assert that food
prices caused the Arab Spring  indeed, the fact that food prices and political unrest are
correlated does not mean that one causes the other this does raise the question of whether
food prices cause political unrest.
1All the food price gures in this paper are from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of
the United NationsFood Price Index, available at http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/
foodpricesindex/en/.
2The expressions political unrest and food riots are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
The reader should keep in mind, however, that the two are generally not synonyms, as political unrest
encompasses other social movements such as labor strikes.
2
To further complicate the relationship between food prices and political unrest, there
appears to be a considerable amount of confusion in the media and among policy makers
as to what is meant by food priceswhen discussing how food prices may cause political
unrest. For some, this means rising food prices. Economists have known since the seminal
work of Deaton (1989) that an increase in the price of a commodity, although it increases
the welfare of the households who are net sellers that commodity, decreases the welfare of
the households who are net buyers of that commodity, and there are numerous instances of
political unrest associated rising food prices throughout history (Rudé, 1964; Walton and
Seddon, 1994; Schneider, 2008; Bush, 2010). For others, this means food price volatility. At
the end of January 2011, French president Nicolas Sarkozy declared that during his tenure as
head of the G-20, he would make price volatility his top priority, going so far as to say that
if we dont do anything, we run the risk of food riots in the poorest countries(Reuters,
2011). Likewise, the FAO had convened its High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and
Nutrition at the end of 2010 with the explicit goal of exploring the causes and consequences
of food price volatility. But not only has food price volatility not signicantly increased in
recent years (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010),3 food price volatility has been found empirically to
decrease the welfare of producers of food, who need to commit resources to production long
in advance of realized prices, while leaving consumers of food largely una¤ected (Barrett,
1996; Bellemare et al., 2011).
This paper studies the relationship between food prices and political unrest.4 More specif-
3Likewise, Jacks et al. (2011) show that although commodity prices are more volatile than the prices of
manufactured goods, commodity price volatility has not increased signicantly over the last 300 years.
4A precise denition of political unrestis provided in section 4 below, when discussing how each variable
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ically, this paper looks at two research questions. It rst looks at whether the relationship
between food prices that is, the food price level and political unrest is causal. Because
food prices and political unrest are jointly determined, however, the incidence of natural dis-
asters (i.e., the number of unpredictable shocks to the supply and demand of food) is used
as an instrumental variable in an attempt to make the food price level exogenous relative to
political unrest. The idea behind this empirical setup is that since commodity markets react
almost immediately to natural disasters,5 and since world commodity markets were better
integrated during the two decades studied in this paper than at any other time in history, a
natural disaster that occurs in one part of the world can push food prices upwards, which
then makes it more likely to observe food riots in another part in the world in the short term.
Indeed, this is what is thought to have happened in late 2010 and early 2011, when oods
in Australia and droughts in Africa raised food prices, which then led to political unrest in
North Africa.
Second, this paper looks at the relationship between food price levels and food price
volatility on the one hand and political unrest on the other hand in an attempt to contribute
to the debate between those who argue that rising food prices cause political unrest and
those who argue that food price volatility causes political unrest.
Using monthly data at the international level, the empirical results indicate that between
January 1990 and January 2011, rising food prices have led to increased political unrest,
retained for analysis was measured.
5This is not merely an assumption. The rst stage of the instrumental variables specications in this
paper directly test the proposition that food markets react immediately (i.e., within the month) to natural
disaster and reject the null hypothesis that they do not.
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whereas food price volatility has actually been associated with decreases in political unrest.
This is not to say that food price volatility is desirable, however, as food price volatility
today can leads to decreased output and thus higher food prices in the future (Clapp,
2009; Naylor and Falcon, 2010). What this means, however, is that it is di¢ cult to make
the case that food price volatility causes political unrest.
This paper is closest in spirit to a recent paper by Arezki and Brückner (2011), who look
at the relationship between food prices and political instability. The approach in this paper
di¤ers from that of Arezki and Brückner in a few ways. First, this paper relies on monthly
food price data, whereas Arezki and Brückner use annual food price data. The advantage
of using monthly data is that this allow capturing short-term (i.e., month-to-month) price
uctuations. The disadvantage of using monthly food price data, however, is that monthly
data on political unrest are not available. Arezki and Brückners advantage is that they
can rely on the well-known International Country Risk Guide data set for their measures of
political unrest, whereas this paper relies on a proxy measure of political unrest constructed
from media sources. The data limitations inherent to either approach highlight the trade-o¤
between the monthly, international approach in this paper and Arezki and Brückners annual,
country-level approach. As such, the analyses in this paper and in Arezki and Brückners
are complementary. Generally speaking, this paper is part of a growing literature at the
intersection of economics and political science on civil conict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).
Given that the world economy is increasingly integrated, an ever higher volume of food
commodities are being traded. This means that food prices are increasingly correlated, and
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so episodes of rising food prices which are expected to occur more frequently given the
threat to agricultural productivity posed by climate change (Lobell et al., 2011) will be
increasingly correlated across countries. Thus, if there is a causal relationship between food
prices and political unrest, this could ultimately mean that episodes of political unrest will
occur simultaneously across countries, which means that food prices have the potential to be
a destabilizing geopolitical force as well as cause irreversible damage to the health of a¤ected
populations by depriving them of nutrients and causing them to be malnourished (Haddad
et al., 1999; Webb, 2010). Of course, the results in this paper do not imply that food prices
are the only cause of food riots. Goldstone (1982) notes that food riots usually break out
when high food prices are accompanied by widespread unemployment. Likewise, the results
in this paper do not imply that rising food prices inevitably cause political unrest. Rather,
the objective of this paper is to show that food prices can have a causal impact on political
unrest in certain cases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background by
discussing food riots throughout history. In section 3, the empirical framework is laid out
and explained. Section 4 discusses the data and presents descriptive statistics. In section 5,
the empirical results are presented and discussed, along with the results of several robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Food Riots in History
Food riots have been frequent throughout history and are thought to have caused the French
Revolution (Rudé, 1964), the fall of the Confederate States of America (Smith, 2011), the
Russian Revolution (Wade, 2005), and the fall of the British Raj in India (Arnold, 1979).
Although there are several studies of food riots in the historical and sociological literatures,
there are few quantitative studies of food riots other than that by Arezki and Brückner
(2011). In order to put the empirical results in this paper in their proper context, what
follows is an overview of food riots in recent history.6
The earliest such study is Rudés (1964) investigation of social movements food riots,
labor disputes, and political protests in France and England between 1730 and 1848. Rudé
begins with the disastrous harvest and famine of 1709 (p.19) in France and goes on to
discuss how bad harvests and other natural disasters in 1787 stirred the whole countryside
into a renewed outbreak of rebellion, which played a vital part in the revolutionary crisis of
1789(p.20) that marked the beginning of the French Revolution. Between 1709 and 1789,
however, food riots occurred in France as a consequence of bad harvests and subsequent
shortages in 1725, 1740, 1749, 1768, 1775, and 1785. Yet until the French Revolution, food
riots were not political in nature.7 Rather, rioters targeted farmers, merchants, and traders
in an e¤ort to force a decrease in food prices. This phenomenon is known to historians as
taxation populaire (Tilly, 1971), i.e., a situation in which farmers, merchants, and traders
6For a survey of the social science literature on riots broadly dened, see Wilkinson (2009).
7Citing Clark (1976), Walton and Seddon (1994) note that before the French Revolution, there was no
question of overthrowing the government or established order, of putting forward new solutions, or even of
seeking redress of grievances by political action(p. 29).
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pay a popular taxby forgoing some prot or incurring a loss as a consequence of the price
ceiling imposed by rioters.
In England, where as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, a greater share of the
population was composed of net consumers of food than in more rural France, Rudé notes
that [o]f some 275 disturbances that [he has] noted between 1735 and 1800, two in every
three (p.35) were food riots. Moreover, food riots tended to break out more often in the
north and west than in the south and east of England given that food more specically,
grain was exported from the latter to the former.
A study of more recent food riots can be found in Walton and Seddon (1994), who study
the impact of the International Monetary Funds (IMF) structural adjustment programs
on the economies of the developing world between 1970 and the early 1990s. According
to Walton and Seddon, even though food riots had largely disappeared from the political
landscape after the middle of the 19th century, they reappeared in the 1970s as a consequence
of an increasingly integrated world economy in which local food prices were increasingly
determined by the international political economy.
Walton and Seddon note that with the exception of Ceylons hartal in 1953, in which
countrywide food riots broke out in response to the government eliminating rice subsidies,
there were only few food riots between the middle of the 19th century and the 1970s,8 and
the few that occurred were local, sporadic events.9 The mid-1970s saw a resurgence of food
8See Taylor (1996) for a study of some of the food riots that broke out in the rst half of the 20th century.
9The food riots of 2001 in Argentina (Auyero and Moran, 2007) were also local in the sense that they did
not occur in a context where food riots broke out in several countries.
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riots, however, as Walton and Seddon count 146 food riots across 39 countries in response
to austerity policies imposed by the IMFs structural adjustment policies between 1976 and
1992. What began in Peru in July 1976 and Egypt in January 1977 peaked in the mid-1980s
and ended in India in February 1992 and Nepal in April 1992. Walton and Seddons volume
includes also case studies of food riots in Latin America, Africa, as well as in the Middle
East and North Africa.
The classicalfood riots studied by Rudé (1964) often took place in the countryside and
involved the rural poor (i.e., individuals and households who remained net buyers of food
even though they might have produced some food themselves). By contrast, the modern
food riots studied by Walton and Seddon (1994) almost always took place in cities and
involved the urban poor and the working class (i.e., individuals and households who are net
buyers of food). Classical and modern food riots di¤ered also in their targets: whereas the
targets of classical food riots were local food producers suspected of price gouging and grain
merchants suspected of speculating, the targets of modern food riots were supermarkets,
government institutions, and symbols of foreign a­ uence such as luxury hotels.
While it is still too early for the history of recent food riots to have been written, Schneider
(2008) provides an overview of the riots that took place across Africa, Asia, Latin America,
and the Middle East during the food crisis of 2008. For each of the 25 countries in which
there were food riots, Schneider thus provides a description of the rioting that took place, of
the governments response to political unrest, and of the state of democracy. Lastly, Bush
(2010) displays an admirable prescience in his discussion of the consequences of the 2008
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food riots in the Middle East and North Africa.
3 Empirical Framework
The contribution of this paper resides in the way it identies the impact of food prices
on political unrest, so this section focuses on the equations to be estimated and on the
identication strategy used in an attempt to establish the causal impact of food prices on
political unrest.
The rst equation to be estimated in this paper is such that
yt = 1 + 1fft + 1t + 1yyt 1 + 1mmt + 1 t + 1t, (1)
where yt denotes the level of political unrest in month t; ft denotes the food price level; t
denotes three-month food price volatility, i.e., the standard deviation of the price series over
the months t, t   1, and t   2;10 ;11 yt 1 denotes political unrest in the previous month; mt
is a vector of monthly indicator variables in month t;  t is a time trend, and t is an error
term with mean zero. Because food riots tend to occur in poor countries, where the average
diet consists mainly of cereals, equation 1 is estimated twice: once for an index of the overall
price of food, and once for an index of the price of cereals. This provides a rst robustness
10Letting the three-month moving average of the price series evaluated at t be t =
1
3
P2
j=0 yt j , the
three-month standard deviation is such that t =
P2
j=0 jyt j   tj. A three-month food price volatility
of zero in a given month would mean that the food price index has remained constant over the last three
months.
11A robustness check is conducted in section 5 which relies instead on six-month food price volatility, i.e.,
the standard deviation of the price series over the months t to t  5.
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checks on the empirical results.
Equation 1 is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). As was discussed in the intro-
duction, the primary objective of this paper is to assess whether food prices cause political
unrest. Because political unrest and food prices are jointly determined, however, the next
section discusses the identication strategy used in this paper in an attempt to make a causal
statement about the impact of food prices on political unrest.
3.1 Identication Strategy
Because food prices cannot be argued to be exogenous to political unrest in equation 1, some
thought must be given as to how to make a causal statement about the impact of food prices
on political unrest. As a rst step toward that goal, it helps to conduct a thought experiment
aimed at coming up with the ideal research design to answer the research question at hand.
In this context, the ideal research design would involve randomizing food prices over a
specic time period and a specic region in order to test the null hypothesis that political
unrest does not respond to rising food prices or food price volatility. A rejection of the null
would then establish beyond any reasonable doubt that there exists a causal relationship
between food prices and political unrest.
Given that it is not feasible to randomize food prices, one has to fall back on an imperfect
albeit credible identication strategy. The identication strategy used in this paper relies on
the use of an instrumental variable (IV), i.e., a variable that is correlated with food prices
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but which is uncorrelated with the error term in equation 1. Such an IV must thus be able
to explain food prices without a¤ecting political unrest except through food prices.
The variable used to identify the causal relationship between food prices and political
unrest in this paper is the number of natural disasters  droughts, episodes of extreme
temperature, oods, insect infestations, storms, volcanic eruptions, and wildres in a given
month. That droughts, episodes of extreme temperature, oods, insect infestations, storms,
and wildres constitute shocks to the supply of food should not be controversial. That
volcanic eruptions should be included among the natural disasters used as an IV, however,
is not immediately obvious. Ó Gráda (2009) and Fraser and Rimas (2010), however, note
that episodes of extreme food scarcity often follow volcanic eruptions.12
The identifying assumption is thus that natural disasters are uncorrelated with 2 in the
equation
yt = 2 + 2f bft + 2t + 2yyt 1 + 2mmt + 2 t + 2t, (2)
where bft is the predicted value of ft obtained from the rst-stage regression of food prices
on natural disasters and all the exogenous covariates in equation 2, such that
ft = 3 + 3nnt + 3t + 3yyt 1 + 3mmt + 3 t + 3t, (3)
12Robustness checks are conducted in section 5 which rely on a progressively narrower denition of natural
disaster and which exclude in turn volcanic eruptions and wildres, storms, insect infestations, and episodes
of extreme temperature.
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where nt is the number of natural disasters in period t, t is an error term with mean
zero, and all other variables are dened as above. Just as in the case of equation 1, equation
2 is estimated twice so as to provide a robustness check on the overall results: once for an
index of the overall price of food, and once for an index of the price of cereals.
How are natural disasters are a good IV for food prices in the context of equations 3
and 2? Natural disasters constitute unpredictable shocks to the supply and demand of
food.13 Although though the use of rainfall as an IV has recently been questioned due to the
predictable nature of rainfall (see the discussion of Miguel et al., 2004 in Sovey and Green,
2011), the natural disasters used in this paper should be unpredictable. Indeed, although
some of the natural disasters included in the IV are more likely in certain seasons (e.g.,
droughts and oods), the presence of month dummies in equations 1 to 2 should greatly
reduce the predictability of natural disasters, if not eliminate it altogether. In other words,
within a given month, the number of natural disasters should be unpredictable. Similarly,
the inclusion of a time trend should control for increases in the number of food riots, in
food prices, in food price volatility, and in the number of natural disasters simply due to
the passage of time. The inclusion of a time trend should thus control for the fact that the
number of natural disasters appears to be increasing over time (BBC, 2004).
Even though it is impossible that political unrest can cause natural disasters by the very
denition of what constitutes a natural disaster, could a natural disaster occur early in a
13Although natural disasters are usually conceived of as shocks to the supply of food (see for example Del
Ninno et al., 2003), the fact that natural disasters can kill large numbers of people makes them likely to also
a¤ect the demand for food.
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given month and inuence the degree of political unrest later on in the same month through a
variable other than food prices? This possibility cannot be ruled out. For example, the World
Bank (2010, p.49) notes that disaster relief is often used by those who oversee its distribution
as an additional weapon in civil conicts. For example, Polman (2010) also provides several
vivid examples where relief, assistance, and the e¤orts of nongovernmental organizations were
captured by specic groups and used as weapons in civil conicts. Likewise, the Indonesian
government used some of the assistance it received after the tsunami of December 2004 to
pacify some of the Free Aceh Movement insurgents, in which case disaster relief was used to
foster peace rather than conict (World Bank, 2010, p.49).
But although it is possible that within a given month, a natural disaster occurs that
inuences the degree of political unrest within the same month through a variable other
than food prices, the dependent variable used in this paper makes this unlikely. Indeed,
the dependent variable only measures instances of food-related political unrest, and not of
protests, demonstrations, riots, strikes, etc. related to other resources, so the likelihood that
nt is correlated with 2t should be relatively low. The next section gives a precise denition
of the dependent variable as well precise denitions of the variables of interest, the IV, and
the control variables, along with a discussion of descriptive statistics.
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this paper come from three sources. The measure of political unrest used
as the dependent variable is a proxy for actual food-related political unrest. It comes from a
LexisNexis Academic search of all news in English between January 1990 and January 2011
containing at least ve occurrences of the terms cereal, commodity, food, grain,
or staple,and their plural forms and at least ve occurrences of the terms demonstra-
tion,mob,protest,riot,strike,unrestor violenceand their plural forms. This
variable will hereafter be referred to interchangeably as the number of food riots, political
unrest, the count of news stories, or the news count.
The number of news sources covered by LexisNexis can vary between time periods as
news outlets move in and out of the data base. This paper, however, assumes that this
occurs at random. Alternatively, even if this introduced a systematic measurement error
problem, the identication strategy would most likely account for this. Indeed, in that case,
one would observe y
0
t = yt + t, in which case equation 1 would become
yt = 1 + 1fft + 1t + 1yyt 1 + 1mmt + 1 t + 1t, (4)
where 1t = 1t   1t, the new error term, has two components (i) the usual error term from
equation 1 1t, and (ii) the measurement error on the dependent variable 1t. A systematic
measurement error problem would then mean that 1t is correlated with ft on the right-
hand side of equation 4, but this is an endogeneity problem similar to the one posed by
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the fact that political unrest and food prices are jointly determined. As a result, the IV
used in an attempt to identify the causal impact of food prices on political unrest overcomes
this endogeneity problem also by virtue of making the variation in food prices exogenous to
political unrest.
The food prices used as the variables of interest are the FAOs food price index and the
FAOs cereal price index.14 The FAOs food price index is a monthly indicator of the price
of food worldwide that covers ve food groups (i.e., meat, dairy, cereals, oils and fats, and
sugar) representing 55 commodities. To come up with an aggregate food price index, the
FAO takes the average of the ve food groups and weights them using group-specic export
shares for the period 2002-2004. The size of the sample used for analysis in this paper 
253 monthly observations from January 1990 to January 2011 inclusively was ultimately
determined by the fact that the FAO started recording food prices in January 1990.
The natural disaster data used to construct the IV used to make food prices exogenous
to political unrest in this paper come from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of
DisastersEM-DAT database, which was used by Strömberg (2007) to study the relationship
between natural disasters and economic development. The disasters retained for analysis in
this paper are those that are thought to constitute shocks to the supply of and demand
for food: droughts, episodes of extreme temperature, oods, insect infestations, storms,
volcanic eruptions, and wildres. Disasters such as earthquakes, mass movements, epidemics,
14The indices used in this paper are nominal, since these are largely what people take into account when
considering prices due to money illusion (Shar et al., 1997; Fehr and Tyran, 2001). Robustness checks
conducted with real food price indices (not shown for brevity, but available from the author upon request)
leave the qualitative results in this paper unchanged.
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and animal stampedes, however, were not retained. A natural disaster is included in the
EM-DAT database only if it satises at least one of the following criteria: (i) at least ten
persons are killed, (ii) at least 100 persons require immediate assistance, are displaced, or
evacuated, (iii) a state of emergency is declared by public o¢ cials, or (iv) public o¢ cials
call for international assistance.15 In the empirical analysis in this paper, a natural disaster
is reported as having occurred in a given month only if it began in that month. A disaster
that unfolded in the current month but which began in an earlier month is thus not recorded
as having occurred in the current month. For example, an episode of extreme temperature
that begins on April 15 and ends on July 13 is only recorded as having occurred in April.
This is because markets react and thus prices respond more importantly to the initial
announcement that a natural disaster has taken place than to its continuation. Natural
disasters whose beginning month was coded as 00in the EM-DAT database were simply
dropped from the data because it was impossible to ascribe them to a specic month. This
assumes that these month-00disasters occur at random.
Turning to descriptive statistics, the average month sees about 69 mentions of food-related
political unrest in the English-language media. This gure masks a considerable amount of
heterogeneity, however, as the number of such mentions ranges from two in February 1990
to 473 in April 2008. Likewise, the food price index was equal to roughly 121 on average,
with a minimum of 85.27 in May 2002 and a maximum of 231.09 in January 2011. The
cereal price index also averaged about 121 between January 1990 and January 2011. The
15More information on the EM-DAT data can be obtained from http://www.emdat.be/explanatory-notes.
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cereals price index, however, was markedly more volatile than the food price index, both
in terms of the standard deviation and of the average three-month volatility for each price
series. Indeed, the three-month standard deviation of the cereals price index is equal to 3.85
on average, whereas the three-month standard deviation of the food price index is equal to
2.35 on average. Six-month volatility exhibits a similar pattern.
Natural disasters most often take the form of oods and storms, with a monthly average
of 11 oods and eight storms. At the other end of the natural disaster spectrum, insect
infestations, volcanic eruptions, and wildres occur on average less than once a month, with
0.11 insect infestations, 0.47 volcanic eruptions, and 0.99 wildres per month. The average
month sees about 23 occurrences of natural disasters.
5 Estimation Results
Before presenting and discussing estimation results for various specications of equations 1
and 2, it is instructive to start by looking at some nonparametric evidence so as to check
whether food prices and political unrest appear correlated at all. In that spirit, gure 1 plots
time series for the food price level, the three-month volatility of the food price level, and for
the count of news stories about food riots between January 1990 and January 2011.
Figure 1 indicates that spikes in the food price level are often accompanied by a spike in
the count of news stories. Spikes in food price volatility, however, seem to follow spikes in
food prices. Although this is true by construction food price volatility is dened here as
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the standard deviation of the food price level time series over the preceding three months,
and so a food price spike in a given period should increase food price volatility in the same
period, everything else equal this already casts some doubt on the hypothesis that food
price volatility causes political unrest.
Turning to the parametric evidence, the coe¢ cient of correlation between the food price
level and the count of news stories is equal to 0.59 and is signicant at the 1 percent level.
Likewise, the coe¢ cient of correlation between food price volatility and the count of news
stories is equal to 0.32 and is also signicant at the 1 percent level.
Both gure 1 and the correlation coe¢ cients just discussed fail to control for possible
confounding factors. The results in the rst two columns of table 2 control for such con-
founding factors by including controls for the count of news stories in the previous month, a
time trend, and a set of monthly dummy variables. The results in columns 1 and 2 show that
once those covariates are included, the food price level and the cereal price level are both
positively associated with political unrest. Moreover, it appears that food price volatility is
negatively correlated with political unrest.
The rst two columns table 2 present interesting correlations between food prices and
political unrest, but those correlations do not imply that food prices cause political unrest.
Columns 3 and 4 attempt to make a causal statement about the impact of the food price
level on political unrest by presenting estimation results in which natural disasters are used
to instrument the food price level. Relative to the results in columns 1 and 2, the results
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in columns 3 and 4 indicate that accounting for the endogeneity of food prices relative to
political unrest entails an almost twofold increase in the estimated impact of food prices on
political unrest. In column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the food price level is
associated with an increase in political unrest of 0.25 standard deviations. In column 3, a
one standard deviation increase in the food price level causes an increase in political unrest
of 0.48 standard deviations. In both columns 3 and 4, the F -statistic on the IV far exceeds
the threshold of 10 set by Stock and Yogo (2002) as minimal level of signicance for an IV
not to be considered weak. This is true for all of the IV estimation results in this paper.
In other words, although the estimated coe¢ cients for the food price level and for food
price volatility in the naïve specications of columns 1 and 2 have the right sign and signi-
cance relative to the same estimated coe¢ cients in columns 3 and 4, they understate the role
of food prices as a determinant of political unrest. Furthermore, the results in columns 3
and 4 show that even when attempting to make a causal statement about the impact of the
food price level on political unrest, the negative relationship between food price volatility
and political unrest remains, although it is impossible to make a causal statement about the
impact of food price volatility on political unrest.
The results in table 2 indicate also that the incidence of political unrest has been in-
creasing over time, given the sign and signicance of the linear time trend, and that the
number of news stories about food riots in a given month is correlated with the number of
news stories about food riots the previous month. This suggests that political unrest tends
to carry over from month to month, but decreasingly so given that the estimated coe¢ cient
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on the count of news stories in the previous month is less than one.
To make sure that political unrest in the current month is not signicantly a¤ected
by political unrest in the months before the previous month, table 3 re-estimates the IV
specications in columns 3 and 4 of table 2 by including the count of news stories in t   2
and in t 3 as explanatory variables. The estimated coe¢ cients for these two variables are not
signicant in either specication, and the estimated coe¢ cients for the food price levels and
food price volatilities are practically una¤ected by the inclusion of these two variables. This
stands in contrast with Besley and Burgess (2002), whose ndings imply that Indian state
governments are more likely to respond to crop ood damage with humanitarian assistance
when there is greater media coverage of the oods in India. In the context of this paper,
greater media coverage in t 1, t 2, and t 3 need be associated with a decrease in political
unrest in t (via improvements in food prices as a result of public food distribution) given
that the data set covers several countries. This could be because the countries in which the
media covers political unrest in t  1, t  2, and t  3 need not be the same as the countries
in which there is political unrest in t.
Table 4 asks whether the results in table 2 are driven by the food crises of 2008 and
2010-2011. The results in columns 1 and 2 thus include a dummy variable equal to one if the
year is 2008 and equal to zero otherwise. Likewise, the results in columns 3 and 4 include a
dummy variable equal to one if the year is 2010 or 2011 and equal to zero otherwise. While
the dummy for 2008 is positive and signicant, which indicates that there has indeed been
more political unrest in 2008 than in all the other years considered in this paper, the dummy
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for 2010-2011 is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. More importantly, the magnitude of the
estimated coe¢ cients for the food price levels remain once again unchanged. The magnitude
of the estimated coe¢ cients for the food price volatilities, however, increase slightly when
controlling for the food crisis of 2008 relative to the results in table 2. This suggests that the
magnitude of the association between food price volatility and political unrest was weaker
in 2008 than at other times.
Could the inclusion of food price volatility drive the result that food prices appear to
cause political unrest? The estimation results in table 5 answer that question in the negative
by showing that the estimated coe¢ cient for the food price levels are still signicant when
food price volatility is omitted, in both the OLS and IV specications.
Finally, the appendix presents estimation results for several robustness checks. Following
Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008), who suggest that running
a regression of the dependent variable on the IV is good practice to ensure that there is indeed
a statistically signicant relationship between the IV and the dependent variable, table A1
presents the results of a reduced-form regression of political unrest on the number of natural
disasters in a given month. That the reduced-form relationship between the IV and the
dependent variable is signicant at the 1 percent level is evidence in favor of the causal chain
from natural disasters to political unrest.
As regards the IV, to make sure that the results in this paper are robust to alternative
denitions of natural disasters,the results in table A2 progressively excludes specic types
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of natural disasters from the IV. In column 1, volcanic eruptions and wildres are eliminated
given that they are the least likely to a¤ect food prices. Columns 2 to 4 progressively remove
storms, insect infestations, and episodes of extreme temperature from the IV. The empirical
results are stable across all these alternative denitions for food prices as well as for cereal
prices.
Following Angrist and Pischke (2008) once again, the results in table A3 test whether
political unrest Granger-causes food prices by including three food price lags as well as three
food price leads. The null hypothesis of no Granger causation owing from political unrest
to food prices is such that the estimated coe¢ cients for the food prices in t + 1, t + 2, and
t + 3 are statistically insignicant. Indeed, if these coe¢ cients were signicant, this would
mean that political unrest Granger-causes food prices, which would cast doubt on the causal
relationship between food price levels and political unrest. Table A3 shows that political
unrest does not Granger-cause food prices.
Lastly, the results in table A4 take a longer view of price volatility by considering six-
instead of three-month food and cereal price volatility. In this case, although the relationship
between food price volatility and political unrest is no longer statistically signicant, the
relationship between food price levels and political unrest is still statistically signicant and
positive. In other words, if food price volatility has an impact on political unrest, it appears
that it is short-term (i.e., three-month) price volatility that matters instead of longer-term
(i.e., six-month) price volatility.
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The empirical results in this paper thus suggest that whether one considers the food price
index or the cereals price index, there seems to be a robust causal relationship owing from
the food price level to political unrest, proxied here by the number of news stories about food
riots. In other words, rising food prices seem to cause food riots. Likewise, the empirical
results suggest that food price volatility often depicted in the media and by policy makers
as the main culprit in causing political unrest is negatively correlated with political unrest,
although this relationship cannot be argued to be causal. This suggests that the debate
surrounding food prices should be recentered on rising food prices rather than focus on food
price volatility.
6 Conclusion
Do food prices cause political unrest? The empirical results in this paper indicate that the
answer to this question is a qualied yes: While rising food prices appear to cause food
riots, food price volatility is negatively associated with political unrest. But even though
the impact of food price volatility on food riots cannot be argued to be causal in the context
of this paper, these ndings go against much of the prevailing rhetoric surrounding food
prices. Indeed, whereas many in the media and among policy makers were quick to blame
food price volatility for the food riots of 2008 and of 2010-2011, the empirical results in this
paper indicate that rising food prices are to blame and that increases in food price volatility
may actually decrease the number of food riots. These ndings are in line with those in the
applied microeconomics literature as to the impact of rising food prices (Deaton, 1989) and
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food price volatility (Bellemare et al., 2011).
What are the implications of these ndings for policy? First, policy makers should focus
on rising food prices, which appear to cause political unrest, rather than on food price
volatility, which is associated with decreases in political unrest. All of the time and e¤ort
that have so far been dedicated to food price volatility would have been better spent on
rising food prices. In the future, this means that policies aimed at increasing the supply of
food will be the most helpful, whether this means investing in agricultural research aimed
at increasing agricultural yields (Dorward et al., 2004), encouraging urban or peri-urban
agriculture (Maxwell, 1995), liberalizing the international trade of agricultural commodities,
increasing access to and the use of biotechnology in developing countries (Paarlberg, 2009),
eliminating farm subsidies in industrialized countries, and so on.
Second, although it may be tempting to do away with consumer food price subsidies in
the current context of budget austerity, policy makers should be very cautious when trying
to eliminate such subsidies. Indeed, in many developing countries, there is a systematic
bias in favor of urban households when it comes to food policy, which pushes governments
to subsidize the price of food for urban households (Lipton, 1977). Given that food riots
almost always occur in urban areas, however, abandoning these food price subsidies may be
ill-advised, especially since these policies often appear to have been put in place to avoid
food riots in the rst place. In such cases, a better policy may be one that progressively
abandons food price subsidies. This is especially so given that it is likely that individuals
exhibit loss aversion over food prices (Timmer, 2010).
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Although food prices are determined on international markets by forces beyond the con-
trol of national governments, policy responses to rising food prices are within the hands of
national governments and should respond to local contexts. What type of policy is best-
suited to each of those contexts will have to rely on analyses conducted at a more micro
level. For now, this is left for future research.
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Figure 1. Food Price Levels, Food Price Volatility, and Political Unrest, January 1990 to January 
2011. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, January 1990 to January 2011 
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Observations 
Dependent Variable 
Count of News Stories 69.29 (55.09) 253 
Food Prices 
Food Price Index 120.91 (31.75) 253 
Cereal Price Index 120.48 (41.34) 253 
Food Price Three-Month Volatility 2.36 (2.73) 251 
Cereal Price Three-Month Volatility 3.85 (4.51) 251 
Food Price Six-Month Volatility 3.76 (4.50) 248 
Cereal Price Six-Month Volatility 6.29 (6.95) 248 
Natural Disasters 
Drought 1.15 (1.27) 253 
Extreme Temperature 1.34 (2.34) 253 
Floods 10.97 (6.06) 253 
Insect Infestations 0.11 (0.57) 253 
Storms 8.06 (4.74) 253 
Volcanic Eruptions 0.47 (0.70) 253 
Wildfires 0.99 (1.34) 253 
Count of Natural Disasters 23.09 (9.45) 253 
 
 
  
 34 
 
Table 2. OLS and IV Estimation Results for the Determinants of Political Unrest, 1990-2011. 
OLS OLS IV IV 
Variable Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Count of News Stories Involving Food Riots 
Food Price 0.435 *** (0.106) 0.839 *** (0.324)   
Food Price Three-Month Volatility -2.160 ** (1.088) -4.586 ** (2.150)   
Cereal Price 0.444 *** (0.084) 0.645 *** (0.231) 
Cereal Price Three-Month Volatility -2.410 *** (0.685) -3.469 *** (1.328) 
Count of News Stories in t - 1 0.311 *** (0.063) 0.285 *** (0.063) 0.240 *** (0.084) 0.239 *** (0.080) 
Trend 0.307 *** (0.046) 0.306 *** (0.045) 0.279 *** (0.052) 0.288 *** (0.049) 
Intercept -38.613 *** (12.835) -36.457 *** (10.935) -75.835 ** (31.091) -53.617 ** (21.437) 
Number of Observations 251 251 251 251 
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Instrument) - - 29.81 37.21 
R-square 0.65 0.66 0.63 0.65 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two 
observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t - 1, and t - 2. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable 
is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
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Table 3. IV Estimation Results for Robustness Checks on the Determinants of Political Unrest Using Quarterly News, 1990-2011. 
  IV IV 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Count of News Stories Involving Food Riots 
Food Price 0.827 ** (0.327) 
Food Price Three-Month Volatility -4.701 ** (2.143) 
Cereal Price 0.635 *** (0.236) 
Cereal Price Three-Month Volatility -3.482 *** (1.336) 
Count of News Stories in t - 1 0.212 ** (0.083) 0.217 *** (0.078) 
Count of News Stories in t - 2 0.048 (0.075) 0.035 (0.074) 
Count of News Stories in t - 3 0.054 (0.069) 0.046 (0.066) 
Trend 0.244 *** (0.057) 0.259 *** (0.054) 
Intercept -75.129 ** (31.485) -53.149 ** (21.905) 
Number of Observations 250 250 
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Instrument) 29.49 36.60 
R-square 0.50 0.70 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
With respect to the full sample of 250 observations, three observations are lost because of the use of the 
dependent variable in t - 1, t - 2, and t - 3 as regressors. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental 
variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
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Table 4. IV Estimation Results for Robustness Checks on the Determinants of Political Unrest Controlling for Food Crises, 1990-2011. 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Count of News Stories Involving Food Riots 
Food Price 0.857 *** (0.316) 0.883 ** (0.393) 
Food Price Three-Month Volatility -6.531 *** (1.897) -4.739 ** (2.369) 
Cereal Price 0.635 *** (0.230) 0.594 ** (0.244) 
Cereal Price Three-Month Volatility -4.418 *** (1.110) -3.282 ** (1.366) 
Count of News Stories in t - 1 0.143 * (0.078) 0.160 ** (0.071) 0.235 *** (0.090) 0.247 *** (0.081) 
Trend 0.319 *** (0.056) 0.321 *** (0.054) 0.282 *** (0.051) 0.283 *** (0.049) 
2008 Dummy 43.488 *** (15.608) 39.110 ** (17.338) 
2010-2011 Dummy -7.923 (16.977) 11.472 (11.255) 
Intercept -75.965 ** (30.558) -51.468 ** (21.641) -80.327 ** (37.923) -48.698 ** (22.690) 
Number of Observations 251 251 251 251 
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Instrument) 31.70 40.70 22.37 33.06 
R-square 0.54 0.67 0.62 0.66 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two 
observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t - 1, and t - 2. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable 
is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
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Table 5. OLS and IV Estimation Results for Robustness Checks on the Determinants of Political Unrest Omitting Price Volatility, 1990-
2011. 
OLS OLS IV IV 
Variable Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Count of News Stories Involving Food Riots 
Food Price 0.313 *** (0.086) 0.608 ** (0.248) 
Cereal Price 0.251 *** (0.066) 0.474 ** (0.193) 
Count of News Stories in t - 1 0.330 *** (0.063) 0.322 *** (0.063) 0.275 *** (0.078) 0.263 *** (0.080) 
Trend 0.293 *** (0.046) 0.296 *** (0.045) 0.247 *** (0.059) 0.254 *** (0.057) 
Intercept -27.446 ** (11.586) -19.904 ** (10.088) -54.793 ** (24.545) -39.037 ** (18.611) 
Number of Observations 252 252 252 252 
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Instrument) - - 34.34 32.83 
R-square 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.63 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, one 
observations is lost because of the use of the dependent variable in t - 1 as a regressor. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 
2002). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. OLS Estimation Results for the Reduced Form Relationship between Natural Disasters and Political Unrest, 1990-2011. 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Count of News Stories Involving Food Riots 
Count of Natural Disasters 1.522 *** (0.355) 
Intercept 34.142 *** (8.857) 
Number of Observations 253 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.01 
R-square 0.07 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels. 
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Table A2. IV Estimation Results for Robustness Checks on the Determinants of Political Unrest Using Alternative Definitions of the 
Instrumental Variable, 1990-2011. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IV Includes Droughts,  
Extreme Temperature, Floods, 
Insect Infestations,  
and Storms 
IV Includes Droughts,  
Extreme Temperature, Floods, 
and Insect Infestations 
 
IV Includes Droughts,  
Extreme Temperature,  
and Floods 
 
IV Includes Droughts  
and Floods 
 
 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Count of News Stories Involving Food Riots 
Food Price 1.026 *** (0.371) 0.958 ** (0.385) 0.915 ** (0.385) 0.969 ** (0.396) 
Food Price Three-Month Volatility -5.707 ** (2.419) -5.299 ** (2.491) -5.043 ** (2.490) -5.369 ** (2.556) 
Count of News Stories in t - 1 0.208 ** (0.091) 0.220 ** (0.093) 0.227 ** (0.092) 0.218 ** (0.094) 
Trend 0.266 *** (0.055) 0.271 *** (0.055) 0.274 *** (0.055) 0.270 *** (0.055) 
Intercept -93.045 *** (35.326) -86.777 ** (36.531) -82.850 ** (36.543) -87.849 ** (37.572) 
Number of Observations 251 251 251 251 
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Instrument) 23.72 21.25 20.89 20.07 
R-square 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.61 
 Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two 
observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t - 1, and t - 2. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable 
is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
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Table A2. IV Estimation Results for Robustness Checks on the Determinants of Political Unrest Using Alternative Definitions of the 
Instrumental Variable, 1990-2011 (Continued). 
  
(1) 
IV Includes Droughts,  
Extreme Temperature, 
Floods,   
Insect Infestations,  
and Storms 
(2) 
IV Includes Droughts,  
Extreme Temperature, 
Floods,  
and Insect Infestations 
 
(3) 
IV Includes Droughts,  
Extreme Temperature,  
and Floods 
 
 
(4) 
IV Includes Droughts  
and Floods 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Count of News Stories Involving Food Riots 
Cereal Price 0.766 *** (0.255) 0.724 *** (0.268) 0.706 ** (0.275) 0.727 *** (0.275) 
Cereal Price Three-Month Volatility -4.107 *** (1.446) -3.890 ** (1.512) -3.794 ** (1.544) -3.906 ** (1.546) 
Count of News Stories in t - 1 0.211 ** (0.085) 0.221 ** (0.087) 0.225 ** (0.088) 0.220 ** (0.088) 
Trend 0.277 *** (0.051) 0.281 *** (0.051) 0.282 *** (0.051) 0.280 *** (0.051) 
Intercept -63.953 *** (23.348) -60.435 ** (24.428) -58.879 ** (24.943) -60.695 ** (24.980) 
Number of Observations 251 251 251 251 
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Instrument) 31.14 27.14 25.60 25.71 
R-square 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two 
observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t - 1, and t - 2. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable 
is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
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Table A3. OLS Estimation Results for a Test of Whether Political Unrest Granger-Causes Food Prices, 1990-2011. 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Count of News Stories Involving Food Riots 
Food Price 1.254 (1.375) 
Food Price Three-Month Volatility -1.763 (1.241) 
Cereal Price 0.471 (0.712) 
Cereal Price Three-Month Volatility -1.539 (1.232) 
Count of News Stories in t - 1 0.359 *** (0.068) 0.377 *** (0.066) 
Trend 0.294 *** (0.051) 0.281 *** (0.049) 
Food Price in t - 1 -0.552 (1.374) -0.548 (0.717) 
Food Price in t - 2 2.057 (1.351) 1.883 *** (0.716) 
Food Price in t - 3 -1.461 * (0.779) -1.248 *** (0.430) 
Food Price in t + 1 -1.747 (1.363) -0.580 (0.684) 
Food Price in t + 2 1.793 (1.340) 0.501 (0.677) 
Food Price in t + 3 -0.919 (0.764) -0.168 (0.405) 
Intercept -39.711 *** (14.537) -23.973 ** (11.927) 
Number of Observations 251 251 
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.00 0.00 
R-square 0.67 0.67 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two observations are lost because food price three-month 
volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t - 1, and t - 2. 
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Table A4. OLS and IV Estimation Results for Robustness Checks on the Determinants of Political Unrest Using Six-Month Price 
Volatility, 1990-2011. 
OLS OLS IV IV 
Variable Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) Coefficient   
(Std. 
Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Count of News Stories Involving Food Riots 
Food Price 0.274 ** (0.107) 0.686 ** (0.324) 
Food Price Six-Month Volatility 0.460 (0.701) -1.103 (1.362) 
Cereal Price 0.185 * (0.101) 0.593 ** (0.308) 
Cereal Price Six-Month Volatility 0.476 (0.547) -1.193 (1.309) 
Count of News Stories in t - 1 0.332 *** (0.064) 0.328 *** (0.064) 0.275 *** (0.078) 0.263 *** (0.081) 
Trend 0.288 *** (0.047) 0.296 *** (0.047) 0.257 *** (0.054) 0.258 *** (0.055) 
Intercept -24.319 * (12.640) -15.440 (11.394) -60.061 ** (29.430) -45.850 * (24.523) 
Number of Observations 248 248 248 248 
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Instrument) - - 30.69 30.58 
R-square 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.62 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, five 
observations are lost because food price six-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, to t - 5. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is weak 
(Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
 
